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Abstract— Functional verification schemes at a level different
from component-level testing are emerging as a cost-effective tool
for those space systems for which the risk associated with a lower
level of assurance can be accepted. Despite the promising poten-
tial, system-level radiation testing can be applied to the functional
verification of systems under restricted intrinsic boundaries.
Most of them are related to the use of hadrons as opposed to
heavy ions. Hadrons are preferred for the irradiation of any
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bulky system, in general, because of their deeper penetration
capabilities. General guidelines about the test preparation and
procedure for a high-level radiation test are provided to allow
understanding which information can be extracted from these
kinds of functional verification schemes in order to compare them
with the reliability and availability requirements. The use of a
general scaling factor for the observed high-level cross sections
allows converting test cross sections into orbit rates.
Index Terms— Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), facilities,
neutrons, protons, radiation hardness assurance, risk acceptance,
single-event effect (SEE), small satellites, system-level testing, test
methodology, total ionizing dose (TID).
I. INTRODUCTION
COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) devices havebeen gaining popularity within the radiation community
during the last two decades, thanks to their higher electri-
cal and electronic performance, when compared to similar
rad-hard parts, and to their reduced price and lead time.
Similarly, interest has been growing around highly integrated
solutions manufactured within the same package (e.g., system-
on-chip, SoC) or assemblies of discrete devices and inte-
grated circuits (ICs) on printed circuit boards (PCBs), boxes,
or modules.
The radiation testing single-event effect (SEE) [1], [2] and
total ionizing dose (TID) [3] standards developed by the
community are in a continuous struggle when it comes to
keeping up with the innovation introduced by brand new
devices (e.g., flip-chips, multiple chips stacked within the
same package, 3-D layouts) which outperform those devices
the standards were tailored for. Among the main criticalities
stands the necessity of making the sensitive volumes (SVs) of
the devices and ICs accessible to those beams, such as heavy
ions, which are typically characterized by high linear energy
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transfer (LET), but short range in matter. It is noted that for
some of these layouts, decapsulation may be unachievable in
some cases.
In view of the emerging challenges, the radiation commu-
nity started questioning whether it was possible to perform
qualification of devices and ICs that could overcome the
usual inconveniences associated with standard testing (e.g.,
use of vacuum chambers, decapsulation) by using deeper
penetrating beams, such as high-energy protons, as a proxy
for heavy ions. An effort that started more than two decades
ago [4], [5] and whose potentialities and limitations are
summarized in a book-of-knowledge for proton board-level
irradiation [6], [7].
Among the potentialities stands the verification of the soft
error response of an entire set of devices at a reduced cost.
At the same time, very loose bounds can be applied to hard
and destructive SEEs (DSEEs) coverage without heavy-ion
testing [8], [9] and, likely, the information extracted is not suf-
ficient to perform a rigorous TID worst case analysis (WCA)
for the considered devices [10].
Nevertheless, due to its cost competitiveness, system-level
testing may find wider applications when it comes to space
missions associated with higher risk acceptance, for example,
CubeSats and NanoSats. Due to schedule and cost con-
straints, such space missions may not afford the cumber-
some qualification based on component-level testing and the
mentioned standards, often running into the highly disputable
no-testing approach. For such missions, system-level testing
on either a radiation model or the flight model itself may
provide a higher level of confidence on the mission success
likelihood while being compatible with schedule and cost
restrictions.
Approaches based on system-level testing are nowadays
already in use for terrestrial applications, for which neutrons
can provide a sufficient coverage for DSEEs, and TID degrada-
tion is not an issue. In the accelerator field [11], system-level
testing is used in a complementary fashion with respect to
component-level testing in that it is used as a qualification
tool only for those devices which are not critical within the
design of the system and as a final verification of the system
functionality.
A few examples for space applications have been reported in
the literature by CNES [12], [13], DLR [14], and University
of Montpellier [15]. System-level radiation testing may find
wider applications in the future for space missions having
criticality classes Q1 and Q2 as defined in the European Space
Agency (ESA) COTS initiative review [16].
Under such promises, this work aims at synthesizing guide-
lines on how to perform system-level radiation testing with
hadrons as a verification tool for high-risk acceptance space
missions. This will include providing a common language
among actors in system design, development, and verification,
a guidance among the various criteria to be borne in mind in
order to decide whether to go for system-level testing (and
under which conditions), the best suited facilities to perform
system-level testing, the test logic and procedure to follow,
as well as the usage of the high-level data extracted from the
test.
II. “SYSTEM” AND SYSTEM-LEVEL RADIATION TESTING
A component can be defined as any electronic device which
cannot be physically partitioned without affecting its capability
of delivering the intended functionality [17]. In this context,
anything that is manufactured on a single chip has to be
considered as a component, for example, SoC.
If the terminology “system” is applied to everything else
at a higher integration level than a component, then a system
can be anything from a PCB, with a few discrete components,
to a whole satellite. In terms of exposing such assemblies to
a radiation field, the challenges are somewhat similar over
this full scale (i.e., not easy to ensure uniform irradiation
with heavy ions, not easy to access all the SVs by decap-
sulation once all devices are placed within the system layout,
not easy to perform standard TID testing). In addition, any
assembly of two or more devices can lead to the generation
of radiation-chain effects, that is, malfunctioning of a device
which is caused from a radiation effect occurring in another
device, which is feeding signals or information to the device
in which the malfunctioning is observed (e.g., data corruption
in a memory fed to a microprocessor).
Systems can be classified according to the following
categories:
1) custom-designed based on COTS, graded, or rad-hard
components;
2) modified off-the-shelf (MOTS) systems;
3) fully commercial.
Custom-designed systems based on COTS are built in-house
by the satellite designer/integrator. In this case, the developer
has control over part screening and selection, traceability of
components, architecture, and can include radiation effects
tolerance and mitigation within the system design. A typical
example is the Function Generator Controller Lite (FGCLite)
system for the CERN large hadron collider [18].
Fully commercial systems are manufactured by a third party
(likewise components) and are intended to be used as they are.
Similar to COTS devices, the satellite designer/integrator may
not be provided with more information than those listed in the
data sheet. Thus, part selection and traceability as well as the
system architecture are often not available.
MOTS systems are an intermediate category. They are
commercial systems whose radiation tolerance is improved
by the end-user, thanks to collaboration agreements with the
manufacturer allowing access to information related to the
internal architecture and the Bill-of-Materials (BoM) to either
apply mitigations or part replacement.
In general, a satellite can be thought of as a custom-designed
system. However, this does not exclude some of its subsystems
from being based on MOTS or fully commercial solutions.
The radiation tolerance of custom-designed systems in space
is generally attained through component-level testing and
screening. At the other end of the spectrum, the radiation
response of fully commercial systems can be established only
though system-level testing, with the only alternative of a
cumbersome reverse engineering process.
System-level radiation testing consists in the experimental
verification of the compliance of the system to the reliability
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Fig. 1. System-level radiation testing with respect to risk acceptance and cost.
and availability requirements defined for the mission by oper-
ating the finished system under radiation. The extent to which
the previous definition can be applied depends on whether
the system-level test can provide the necessary insight to the
radiation performances.
System-level radiation testing can be, in general, used to
shed light upon:
1) functional reliability with the existing set of components
and architecture;
2) functional availability with the embedded software and
firmware and for the selected space environment;
3) criticalities arising from the radiation effects of single
components or dependent faults and failures;
4) criticalities due to the design itself;
5) whether the system can perform self-recovery;
6) whether other implemented mitigation techniques (e.g.,
derating, transient filtering, error correction codes) are
effective;
7) additional system-level mitigations to be implemented at
hardware or software level.
Other than a verification tool for high-risk acceptance space
missions that would alternatively follow a no-testing scheme,
system-level testing can also be considered as a complement
to component-level characterization for noncritical subsystems
and as a final verification tool for very complex systems whose
components previously sustained a complete component-level
screening. For the latter, it is noted that the radiation response
of complex systems in the working configuration (although
they are designed following a rigorous qualification) may still
be dominated by dependent faults and failures or synergistic
effects that were not easy to anticipate by modeling (e.g.,
fault-tree analysis or failure mechanism effects and analysis).
In this case, system-level testing can exercise the system as
a stochastic fault injection tool in accordance with the actual
probability of fault occurrence. Fig. 1 summarizes some of
these concepts by positioning the various available options in
terms of risk acceptance and costs.
III. RISK ACCEPTANCE
When facing the decision on whether to go for system-level
radiation testing, the user shall carefully assess what kind
of coverage is achievable through system testing and what
are its limitations. NASA provides recommendations on this
subject [19] while accounting for mission environment, appli-
cation, and lifetime.
The mission environment plays a significant role in defining
the risk acceptance. The two main threats to the mission
reliability and success are 1) cumulative TID and total non-
ionizing dose (TNID) effects and 2) the stochastic DSEEs
related to a single particle strike. Note that not all DSEEs
are stimulated by hadrons (due to the limited energy imparted
to the secondary ions [20]), whereas they can be stimulated by
heavy ions provided that the LET is high enough. The reasons
why these two threats may be very critical when it comes to
system-level radiation testing are that:
1) this test cannot provide the wide insight necessary to
perform WCA following parametric drifts induced by
TID and TNID;
2) the use of hadrons does not cover the full spectra
of particles encountered in the space environment and
responsible for DSEEs.
These radiation effects are not only critical when it comes
to determining and verifying the radiation response, but have
implications on the design of the system itself by, for example,
derating [21] of the components in order to avoid DSEEs.
That is why whenever components susceptible to DSEEs
[such as single-event burnout (SEB) or single-event gate
rupture (SEGR)] have to be used in the system, a prelimi-
nary characterization at component level is always mandatory.
This is in order to establish the correct derating to apply
to the system. Use of default derating factors, for example,
50% in the case of aviation [22] may not provide sufficient
coverage due to the presence of heavy ions in the space
environment. The costs associated with a change in the design
upon discovery of a failure at a late stage in the development,
as it would be for verification by system-level testing only,
would overpass the initially predicted cost benefits of the
verification [23].
The radiation response variability over different technolo-
gies and semiconductor materials is also an important factor
to consider because of several subtle radiation effects that may
characterize certain devices. One of them is the enhanced low-
dose-rate sensitivity (ELDRS) [24], the effect of which is to
produce a larger degradation when the dose rate is lower (like
in the application) than usually applied in accelerated testing.
Component-level standards [3] provide recommendations for
testing devices that may be susceptible to ELDRS. However,
if the system-level radiation testing is performed through a
single verification in a hadronic environment (i.e., an environ-
ment obtained by nuclear spallation of a high-energy proton
beam with a high-Z target and usually composed of a wide
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spectra of protons, neutrons, and pions or a selection of them),
the dose rate may represent a lower constraint than the suitable
hadron flux for the SEE screening. Thus, ELDRS may end
up being untested and unassessed. At the same time, ELDRS
does not usually appear below a TID of 10 krad(Si) [25].
Hence, there are space missions for which it can be
neglected.
Variability in the degradation among materials may be a
big deal when it comes to displacement damage (DD) [26]
where variability cannot only be observed in how the materials
degrade, but also in the different effects produced by different
particles, for example, protons as opposed to neutrons, making
the non-ionizing energy loss (NIEL) approximation fall apart.
Once again, these effects are likely to happen when significant
TNID has to be delivered to the devices, which may not be
the case for most of the systems whose reliability could be
verified through system-level radiation testing.
Similar to component-level radiation testing, the outcome
of a system-level radiation test is described on a pass/fail
basis when it comes to reliability. The main difference is
the severity that a “fail” outcome has on the system design
choices. Discarding a component through prescreening comes
mainly at the cost of the beam time and test preparation. A fail
outcome for the entire system may, in the best case, lead to a
reiteration in the design in order to solve the issue encountered
during the test by mitigation and, in the worst case, may
require a full redesign of an already developed prototype.
Observing only high-level radiation effects on the system
without delving deeper into the component characterization
may also be problematic when it comes to implement solutions
that could mitigate or solve a potential source of unreliability
emerging as an outcome of the test. The failure of a device
in the system makes it quite easy to identify the culprit.
However, there may be other failures for which clear root
causes may be hard to spot, for example, when failures
are caused by the concurrent degradation of several devices
or by other SEE-related dependent failures. Hence, also the
depth of observability in system-level radiation testing may
need to be calibrated in order to increase the number of
observable parameters for a correct outcome interpretation.
Clearly, this may lead to longer test-bench preparations and
potential compatibility issues with the facility.
Generally, a “pass” outcome from system-level radiation
testing comes with a limited level of confidence. The afore-
mentioned component-level testing standards for TID suggest
performing tests over 10 parts to assess and account for
the intralot variability. The outcome of a single system-level
test may not be replicable over other units (even when the
traceability of the single components is respected) due to:
1) one or more units may fail due to unlikely radiation
effects that cannot be reproduced on all units with the
targeted fluence;
2) the units may be tested under different conditions of
voltage, frequency, temperature, and application, which
can impact both cumulative degradation and stochastic
event probability [27].
For TID and TNID, the only possibility to increase the
confidence on the outcome would be to test up to margined
TABLE I
CRITICALITY CLASSES TO DEFINE SYSTEM-LEVEL EFFECTS
doses, whereas for SEEs, as long as the irradiation source
provides negligible levels of TID and TNID, testing the flight
model may mitigate the associated risk (although testing flight
equipment shall also be carefully assessed and traded based
on the risk of suffering DSEEs during the verification test
itself).
IV. RADIATION EFFECTS AT SYSTEM-LEVEL AND
RADIATION-TOLERANT SYSTEM
Similar to component-level effects, a common language for
system-level radiation effects, may be introduced to facilitate
information exchange and data portability. The aim is to
describe the radiation effects so that they are strictly connected
to the functional reliability and availability of the system
(hence, more promptly linked to the system requirements).
The main system-level radiation effect is the loss of func-
tionality, that is, the condition under which the system stops
either temporarily or permanently to deliver its intended
top-level functionality or starts delivering it outside of speci-
fications. A classification can be made based on the criticality
chart in Table I.
Class 0 effects are radiation effects occurring on a device
that do not propagate up to the top-level functionality because
they are either filtered, masked, or unasserted at the moment
they happen. All such effects will not have any impact on the
system availability or reliability. Class 0 effects are generally
attained once system mitigation is implemented.
Class 1 effects can produce visible, though very mild, effects
on the system functionality, which in turn may affect the
system availability. They are usually originated at component
level by either single-event upsets (SEUs), single-event tran-
sients (SETs), multiple-cell upsets (MCUs), or single-event
functional interrupts (SEFIs). Their limited impact is due to
the fact that they may last one iteration in a digital processing
system or that they can last for a few fractions of a second
as analog signals. Note that not all SEFIs can be included
in this category. SEFIs will be classified as soft losses of
functionality (SLF) only if the system can recover from them
without relying on power cycling.
Class 2 effects differ from class 1 because they may have
a stronger impact, mainly due to the fact that the associated
downtime for the system is longer. The larger downtime is
usually associated with the need of performing a power cycle
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of the whole system in order to remove the undesired radiation
effect. This is the case of single-event latchups (SELs) and
SEFIs. Note that both these events require the use of super-
vising circuitry to be removed. For the SEL, to detect the
current increase and, for the SEFI, to detect the interruption
of the function. Unless mitigated (by, e.g., scrubbing), some
SEUs in the configuration logic and memory of digital devices
may lead to continuous malfunctioning of the system that
may not result in an SEFI. In this case, probably a power
cycling will be needed as well to remove these uncorrectable
SEUs. Hence, they may also be considered as hard losses of
functionality (HLF).
Class 3 effects can affect the reliability of the system.
Class 3 effects can have as root causes the degradation induced
by TID and TNID, DSEEs, unmitigated milder SEEs, or even
dependent failures. This includes SEBs, SEGRs, unprotected
SELs, and unrecoverable SEFIs. In any case, the end effect
observed during the test or the mission is that the system
functionality is lost and cannot be recovered by any means.
Note that this does not apply only to sudden failures due to
stochastic events, but it also applies to continuous degradation
imparted by TID and TNID. That is, the system may still
be operating, but outside of the specifications that are set in
the requirements (e.g., system unable to provide high enough
voltage, provided output signals with too low margin with
respect to noise).
The proposed classification is meant to provide a common
taxonomy among users. However, other classifications [28] can
be considered given their complementarity.
Other than the various degrees of loss of functionality,
several degraded modes can be observed during a test. The
simplest is the degradation of performance due to the para-
metric degradation from TID and TNID. That is, the system
keeps on providing its full functionality, but nominally, this is
provided at lower speed, with the system working at higher
temperature or with the system requiring a higher power
consumption. As long as the variations are still within the
specifications, these effects are not to be considered losses,
but just degradations.
Other degraded modes may be more impactful, but still not
bring to end effects comparable to a loss of functionality. For
instance, a few stuck bits in a memory device may reduce
the total throughput of the memory, but this may be tolerable
because the system does not make full use of the memory
resources available. Even the failure of a single device due to
SEB can be considered only a degradation if either the impact
to the global functionality is limited (because the system used
several of those same devices to accomplish its duty) or if
there are redundancies.
Based on the pure top-level radiation effects,
a radiation-tolerant system is a system that can provide
its functionality under the declared specifications in the
defined radiation environment while not suffering from
permanent loss of functionality (PLF), that is, it is compliant
with the reliability requirements. A radiation-tolerant system
may suffer from HLF and SLF and manifest degraded modes
of operation as long as their impact is compliant with the
availability requirements.
Fig. 2. Range and LET of heavy ions at various energies that are within the
current ground test capabilities.
V. BEAM AND FACILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR
SYSTEM-LEVEL RADIATION TESTING
Concerning the most suitable beam conditions, some
requirements are provided based on the cases for which the
system under consideration can be as complex as a small
satellite having a 3-D layout arrangement resulting in a volume
of 50 × 50 × 50 cm3. The considerations made and beam
requirements proposed for such kind of system can be relaxed
depending on the geometry and layout configuration of the
system the user is willing to test.
Since the space environment cannot be reproduced with
fidelity at ground-level accelerators (in terms of the full spectra
of particles involved as well as dose rate over proton and
heavy-ion fluxes ratio), some compromises have to be made in
order to propose a system-level radiation testing methodology
which can be applicable to the existing facilities.
The main driver for facility selection is the beam homogene-
ity, both depth-wise and over a wide enough surface. In order
to ensure uniformity of the irradiation of the system, what
standards typically require is that the homogeneity is kept
within ±10%.
Homogeneous depth-wise irradiation is quite critical, as it
can be ensured only by highly energetic and highly penetrating
beams. In addition, the selected beam shall not be prone
to strong fragmentation while traversing various layers of
material at the penalty of decreasing the beam intensity and
significantly altering its composition.
Fig. 2 reports the main features of protons and ions avail-
able at ground-level facilities (considering Europe and North
America, although the whole state space is achieved only at
NASA Space Radiation Laboratory (NSRL) [29]) nowadays
based on the ion species and the primary energy. The LETs and
ranges reported in the figure were calculated with Stopping and
Range of Ions in Matter (SRIM) [30] using silicon as reference
material. Note that if the range is used as a metric to qualify
which ions may be suitable, no ions can be found that have
both a surface LET of 30 MeV/(mg/cm2) and a penetration in
silicon of 5 mm. This means that it is not very likely to find
ions suitable for the radiation testing of systems having an even
not so deep volume. Suitable ions in terms of range would have
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LETs which can indeed be found in hadron secondary ions in
silicon.
Note that considering only range and surface LET of the
ions is not sufficient. Indeed, the figure does not provide any
information about:
1) the ion beam fragmentation as the ions traverse the var-
ious layers of material, which results in a high-intensity
reduction of the primary beam;
2) the fact that even for a single one-sided PCB, the various
SVs may be under diverse thicknesses of packaging and
shielding material, resulting in a nonhomogeneity of the
surface LET at the SV [31];
3) the SVs of the devices may be shallower or deeper,
resulting in further variable energy deposition event
probability.
As a result, when using ions to irradiate a system,
the devices composing the system will be subjected to spectra
of particles, whose LET, Bragg peak distribution, and local
flux will not guarantee homogeneity.
In terms of depth-wise homogeneity, high-energy protons
are a better fit for energies of a few hundreds of MeV. In this
case, it is not the primary LET of the proton that matters, rather
it is the LET of the secondary ions generated by hadron–silicon
interactions, which can be in the range 0–15 MeV/(mg/cm2).
In addition, these ions are generated within the SV itself or
in its close proximities. Protons do well for soft SEE testing;
however, the initial LET of the secondary ions can often be
insufficient to trigger those events requiring deep ionization
tracks such as SEL, SEB, and SEGR [8], [9] because they
would result in lower energy deposition events than with
shallower volumes. That is why DSEE coverage cannot be
ensured with proton testing.
Other than mono-energetic protons, depth-wise homogene-
ity can be ensured by beams with similar characteristics. This
is the case of neutrons produced through nuclear spallation and
of mixed fields made of protons, neutrons, and pions. This is,
for instance, the case of the ChipIr [32] and the CERN Highly-
AcceleRated Mixed-field (CHARM) [33] facilities. Both facil-
ities are characterized by spectra of particles from very low
energies to very high energies (up to 800 MeV at ChipIr and
up to 24 GeV at CHARM).
Fig. 3 provides a comparison of penetration capabilities
of the hadronic beams available in a few selected facilities
with respect to the penetration capabilities of the low-Earth
orbit (LEO) proton environment. The LEO proton environment
was calculated with the Cosmic-Ray Environment and Effects
Models (CREME) online tool [34]. It accounts for both
trapped proton and galactic cosmic proton spectra determined
for an orbit with 800-km altitude, 98◦ inclination, and solar
minimum conditions. Note that for the considered CHARM
spectrum in the figure, the maximum hadron energy is 3 GeV.
Also, for both the LEO environment and the facilities, the plot-
ted beam intensity accounts only for hadrons having a mini-
mum energy of 20 MeV.
The figure is meant to compare the penetration capabilities
of the various fields into growing thickness of aluminum,
which is taken as a representative of the diverse shielding
provided by the various layers of materials of a typical space
Fig. 3. Penetration depth of protons in aluminum in the LEO proton
environment compared to that of the mixed field available at CHARM,
that of spallation neutrons available at ChipIr and that from a 200-MeV
mono-energetic proton beam. Only hadrons with energy above 20 MeV are
considered for both space and facility environments.
system. The LEO proton spectrum decays very fast. After 2
cm of aluminum, its intensity is reduced to just 40% of that
of the original. This is mainly due to the limited energy of
trapped protons, making the most part of the environment.
The three facility beams are not as strongly affected. After 2
cm of aluminum, the 200-MeV proton and ChipIr field will
preserve more than 95% of the intensity of the primary beam,
whereas CHARM is above 90%.
Hence, when irradiating a system in these facilities, and
provided there is no more than 2 cm of aluminum of equivalent
material between the front face and the back face, the beam
intensity would reduce by less than 10%, ensuring depth-wise
homogeneity. For 200-MeV protons and ChipIr that homo-
geneity would be maintained for up to 4 cm of equivalent
aluminum.
Other than depth-wise homogeneity, beams produced by
nuclear spallation are widely emitted in every direction. Hence,
at sufficient distance from the source, the resulting beam will
be homogeneous over a large surface. This is quantified in
70 × 70 cm2 for ChipIr and 100 × 100 cm2 for CHARM.
Mono-energetic proton beams are usually developed to irradi-
ate devices and are associated with small field sizes. The only
mono-energetic proton beam facility that can provide a field
up to 60 × 60 cm2 is NSRL.
Flux is also an important parameter for the selection of
facilities for system-level radiation testing, in particular, for
digital architectures. However, it is not always easy to find
facilities that can provide the most appropriate test conditions.
The problem is dual, since it may be due to (i) the pulsed time
structure of the beam (that all the mentioned facilities have to
various extents) and (ii) to the average flux itself, which is
not always tunable over several orders of magnitude, thus not
allowing to find an optimum for the system under test (SUT).
For these two reasons, radiation effects strictly related to the
beam configuration may occur that are not relevant for the
final application. While it is still possible (in some cases) to
have some play on the average flux, not much can be done for
the time structure of the beam. This is because it is very rare
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(and quite impractical) to build accelerating structures reaching
1-GeV energy with continuous beam acceleration.
In conclusion, an optimal fit for all the parameters at play
to perform system-level radiation testing could not be found
and, in the context of this guideline, best trade-offs have been
selected in order to propose a methodology that could be
implemented with what is nowadays available in terms of
facilities.
If the purpose of the system-level radiation test is TID,
most of the classic Co-60 sources can provide both depth-wise
and surface-wide homogeneity for irradiation of a system
having the aforementioned volume. The existing standard for
devices [3] may be of direct application in this case.
VI. DESIGN OF THE TEST
System-level testing can be quite challenging also in terms
of test preparation. At a minimum, even when using the flight
model as is, the user may be capable of observing and logging
the following parameters (depending on the system input and
output):
1) system-level SELs (sudden current increase over one of
the power domains of the system);
2) SEFIs on the main control element;
3) SETs on the output voltage/current;
4) data corruption of output data streams;
5) frequency reduction;
6) drifts of input voltage and current.
Other localized effects leading to the failure of the system
(e.g., device failure due to SEB) may be identified after
the test.
Increasing the radiation effect observability at a lower level
(i.e., down to single critical devices) would be desirable
in order to better understand radiation effects and potential
remedies. However, a balance has to be kept. Overloading
the system with points of measurement or code-level instru-
mentation may alter the original system functionality and,
thus, either produce new artificial radiation effects or alter
the severity or rate of occurrence of the actual system-level
effects. Hence, proper testing of the radiation model of the
system prior to irradiation shall be accomplished in order to
exclude any malfunctioning arising from the setup itself.
Other than the intrinsic non-observability of some effects
(e.g., TID-induced drifts in worst case scenarios), some effects
may not be observed due to constraints imposed by how
the test equipment should comply with the facility interfaces
and regulations. Usually, test equipment has to be kept far
from the beam, thus relying on long cables. These may lead
to two undesired effects: voltage drop and signal-to-noise
ratio decrease. The former resulting in an insufficient biasing
of the system that may even trigger undesired setup-related
effects [35]. The latter resulting in data reception corruption
that is not produced within the system as a radiation effect,
but rather in the cable as a parasitic setup effect.
DSEE mitigation at test-bench level should be implemented
when possible, or, as an alternative, at the level of the
equipment in order to avoid that unprotected effects may end
the test very early. Several mitigations can be implemented
directly within the system or at the equipment level [36].
VII. TEST LOGIC
One of the main challenges for the execution of a proper
system-level radiation test is under which conditions the
system has to be tested in order to provide representative infor-
mation about reliability and availability, while not masking
fault/failure modes due to the way the system is operated.
In component-level testing, one can perform device radiation
testing and data analysis based on worst case conditions (e.g.,
of biasing, temperature, frequency). However, when operated
in a system, the devices are set to work under a specific
envelope of conditions (if not just a single one that can be
quite far from worst case).
While it is sometimes suggested to test under real work-
ing conditions, it is also true that systems are very rarely
designed to work under a unique set of parameters or modes.
For instance, when testing a satellite, this may have several
different modes of operation (scientific acquisition, data down-
link, telemetry and command uplink and downlink, battery
recharging, etc.), which may not employ all parts of the system
at the same time or may employ those parts under different
loads.
At the same time, even finding a single system, worst case
condition may not be so easy due to competing effects and
sensitivities among devices within the system. For instance,
device-level standards [1], [2] mention that the worst case for
SEL would be high temperature, whereas for SEB it would be
room temperature.
The situation becomes even more critical when only one
SUT is available and the radiation source also provides cumu-
lative degradation by TID/TNID. Some drivers that can help
defining the best test configuration within the operating state
space that would provide a representative insight for a system
functional verification are:
1) the types of radiation effects that the system is expected
to be prone to during the test and whose occurrence
would potentially set a critical situation for the system;
2) the conditions under which the system is supposed to
be operated for most of the time during its intended
mission;
3) the conditions imposing the largest electrical loads on
the widest set of devices;
4) performing a multipurpose test (whenever low
TID/TNID is deposited in the system):
a) to exclude DSEEs;
b) running under highest data load and frequency to
find upper bounds to data corruption rates.
Generally, performing a “duty-cycle” radiation testing of
the satellite encompassing the various operating modes may
be suitable in order to exercise the system under representative
conditions whenever a clear worst case condition for the whole
system cannot be found. Defining a parametric envelope for
the set of variables under test can also provide a valuable
option.
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One critical aspect of the system-level test is to select a
flux that does not lead the system into HLF with a too high
rate. In addition, a moderate flux can ensure that the observed
events are linear with the fluence and not the combination of
accumulated events over a short time period due to the high
flux of the accelerated test, which would not be representative
of the low-flux conditions found in space.
The last two points are particularly critical when testing a
system whose component radiation data are not known because
it would be much harder to interpret whether the observed
radiation effects are caused by the beam configuration or actual
system faults. In order to mitigate that it is strongly advised
to start the test with a low flux and then ramp it up and decide
upon the observed system response. Generally, full analog
systems can sustain stronger fluxes than digital systems, but
it is advised not to go above 107 hadrons/cm2/s. Full digital
systems, on the other hand, are often plagued by flux-induced
effects for fluxes higher than 106 hadrons/cm2/s.
Additionally, when using the duty-cycle radiation testing
scheme, it is recommended to set the flux so that, on average,
at least ten consecutive duty cycles can be completed between
two consecutive HLFs. For other cases, in general, it is
recommended to set the flux so that the time between two
HLFs is, on average, at least a 100 times the recovery time of
the system.
When more than one SUT unit is available for testing (in
general, for systems to be produced in hundreds or thousands
of units), the worst case condition for the system can be
found empirically by testing the various SUTs under different
conditions. Some of the facilities previously mentioned allow
performing the parallel irradiation of many systems, thanks to
their broad beam. A few additional units can then be tested
under the identified worst case condition to improve the level
of confidence on the positive outcome of the first SUT unit.
VIII. TEST OUTCOME AND DATA EXPLOITATION
A. Functional Reliability
As earlier said, the test outcome on reliability is defined
on a pass/fail basis. For the pass case (no PLF) against
stochastic events of radiation, a cross section with 2σ level of
confidence can be determined based on the statistical Poisson




The high-energy hadron (HEH) fluence HEH can be used as
a general measurement of the flux for a hadronic environment.
The general approximation behind the definition of HEH [38]
is that all hadrons (in Np amount) from an energy above
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The main justification is that DSEEs can be triggered only
by hadrons with energy above 20 MeV. Note that when com-
bined with this fluence, the previously defined σPLF is assumed
TABLE II
ALPHA FACTORS (UNITS OF cm−2 day−1 ) FOR THE CONSIDERED
TEST FACILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE LEO ENVIRONMENT
(800 km, 98◦ , SOLAR MINIMUM, 100 MILS OF AL, TRAPPED
PROTONS, AND GALACTIC COSMIC RAYS) FOR THE
SEL-LIKE AND SEU-LIKE VOLUMES
to be a step function starting at 20 MeV. This may generally
yield higher rates than expected, although it was shown that
usually these are within a factor of 1.5 for irradiations done
at CHARM [39], [40].
When it comes to TID/TNID, the test outcome is pass if
the system did not experience PLF up to the targeted (and
potentially margined) doses. The level of confidence on the
outcome can even be increased if the test is prolonged to the
ultimate dose required to observe the ultimate failure of the
system.
Only for failures due to unprotected SELs and unmitigated
SEFIs can the user easily implement mitigation out of a
fail outcome. Failure by TID/TNID and DSEEs may, on the
other hand, require either part replacement or system design
reiteration, which are not straightforward.
B. Functional Availability
Cross sections for HLF and SLF can be determined similar
to component-level cross sections. The actual root cause of
the system-level effect may not be required to be determined
(e.g., whether it was an SEFI or SEL) as long as the system is
protected against permanent damage. Root causes may, on the
other hand, be crucial whenever the loss of functionality rate
is too high and a reduction or solution could be found by
mitigation.
Other than the cross section, the typical system downtime
associated with the observed interruption can be used to
determine the actual availability of the system. Note that the
calculated availability for the mission based on environmental
fluxes, test cross sections, and downtime may be strongly
impacted by the mode of operation set for the system. Hence,
calculating a rate for each mode of operation may be better.
C. Environmental Similitude for Stochastic Events
The similitude in terms of energy deposition event response
among space proton-dominated environments and the pro-
posed facility hadronic environments can allow calculation
of the expected on-orbit rates whenever events are observed
during the test [41], [42]. This concerns only those events
that can be triggered by hadron–silicon nuclear recoils, that
is, it is applicable to those devices with a low enough volume
equivalent LET (LETeq,V ) threshold. Not much can be said
about those events that cannot be stimulated by the hadronic
environment of the test and only very weak upper bounds
on the worst device response to heavy ions can be applied,
typically in the order of 0.01 event/device/day for mild envi-
ronments and even weaker for harsher ion environments.
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The on-orbit event rate can be directly obtained from the
measured cross section during the test in the proposed facilities
by multiplication of the latter for an appropriate factor called












































Note that this can be applied also to heavy-ion on-orbit rate
predictions whenever the LET threshold of the device is low
enough.
Fluktuierende Kaskade (FLUKA) 4.0 [43], [44] is used
to perform Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations of the energy
deposition event response of a LEO environment for an
orbit of 800 km, 98◦, solar minimum conditions, 100 mils
of aluminum, and including both the trapped protons and
the galactic cosmic-ray heavy ions with angular isotropic
distribution. MC simulations are also used to extract the
energy deposition event response for the CHARM mixed field,
the ChipIr spallation neutron beam, and a mono-energetic
200-MeV proton beam. The SVs under consideration are two:
a first one is representative of certain SEL structures (20 × 4
μm surface with 3 μm thickness [45]) and the second one is
representative of highly scaled SEU structures (0.31 × 0.31
μm surface with 0.31-μm thickness [46]).
Note that, unlike soft errors, the use of hadrons for the
test is insufficient to screen against SELs for all those devices
that may be characterized by either a low heavy-ion saturation
cross section or a high LET threshold. This limitation mainly
comes from the fact that hadrons are quite inefficient at
producing secondary ions of sufficient LETeq,V . For instance,
about 104 ions/cm2 having a LETeq,V > 3 MeV/(mg/cm2) will
be generated for a fluence of 1011 HEH/cm2 and a volume
with 3-μm thickness, that is, much lower than the typical ion
fluence used for standard heavy-ion component-level testing.
More ions can be produced with a higher fluence, but this has
to be traded off with the increased ionizing and non-ionizing
dose deposited by the primary charged hadrons. In this respect,
1011 HEH/cm2 can be considered a good trade-off value
considering the deposited dose of 56 Gy(Si) for a pure
proton beam and the amount of secondary ions generated, also
considering that little can be gained in terms of LETeq,V of
the secondary ions themselves. The same neutron fluence will
deposit less than 5 Gy(Si) while providing secondary ions in
similar amount.
The choice of 3-μm thickness for the SEL SV is also
representative of only a few devices, but it can be considered
representative for those devices that can suffer from SELs in
Fig. 4. Event rate normalized to a device surface of 1 cm2 per day for
the LEO environment (800 km, 98◦, solar minimum, 100 mils of Al, trapped
protons, and galactic cosmic rays) compared with those from CHARM, ChipIr,
and 200-MeV protons scaled by the respective alpha factors. The volume
considered for the MC calculations is typical of certain SEL structures.
hadronic environment as this size would be quite compatible
with typical secondary ion ranges from hadrons’ inelastic
reactions. In other words, devices with thicker SVs would
typically not experience events in hadronic environments,
unless having an extremely low LET onset.
For these reasons, the proposed analysis has to be taken as a
reliable event rate prediction tool for the space environment of
concern only and solely when a significant amount of events
are seen with hadron testing.
The purpose of using very different structures is to check
whether a general alpha factor can be derived no matter the
SV and whether this can be used to calculate on-orbit rates
affecting availability even whenever the originating cause of
the observed system-level fault is unknown.
One of the main assumptions is the choice of the LET∗eq,V
at which the facility energy deposition distributions have to be
scaled with respect to that of the space environment. However,
α weakly varies for LET∗eq,V in the 1–10 MeV/(mg/cm
2)
range, regardless of the considered facility. Thus, a value of
3 MeV/(mg/cm2) [42] can suitably represent both the events
originating from proton indirect ionization and heavy-ion
direct ionization.
The alpha factors for the two SVs and the three facilities
for the mentioned LEO environment are reported in Table II.
From these calculations, 200-MeV protons provide basically
the same α regardless of the considered volumes, whereas
CHARM and ChipIr are supposed to provide a lower estimate
for SEU than SEL.
The respective α are used to calculate the plots in
Figs. 4 and 5, for the SEL SV and the SEU SV, respectively.
The plots show the event rate in units of SEE/day normalized
to a device-sensitive surface of 1 cm2. The facility rates are
also divided by the acceleration factors of the test. By selecting
LET∗eq,V = 3 MeV/(mg/cm2) for α, the event rate curves tend
to overlap for LETeq,V > 1 MeV/(mg/cm2) with just a small
bunch of heavy-ion events at high LETeq,V not covered.
Fig. 6 shows the alpha factor as a function of LETeq,V for
various facilities and SEL SVs with 3- and 10-μm thicknesses.
Other than reinforcing the generality for the choice of the
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Fig. 5. Event rate normalized to a device surface of 1 cm2 per day for
the LEO environment (800 km, 98◦, solar minimum, 100 mils of Al, trapped
protons, and galactic cosmic rays) compared with those from CHARM, ChipIr,
and 200-MeV protons scaled by the respective alpha factors. The volume
considered for the MC calculations is typical of certain highly scaled SEU
structures.
Fig. 6. Alpha factor as a function of the volume equivalent LET for the SEL
SV with 3 μm and 10 μm thicknesses for the various facilities.
LET∗eq,V for the 3-μm thickness, the plot shows that for thicker
volumes, the alpha factor diverges rather swiftly above 3
MeV/(mg/cm2). This shows that the method works well for
those devices whose SEL SV is rather thin. These are usually
the devices for which SELs in hadron environment can be
observed. So, the validity of the method is not compromised.
Devices having thicker volumes, on the other hand, usually
do not display SELs in hadron environment. To this end, it is
reminded that the alpha method can be considered accurate
only if events are seen with hadrons, whereas not much can
be concluded for 0 events.
All in all, despite the use of very different volumes and test
environments, the α is not seen to vary much, to the point
that a general value of (1 ± 0.3) × 107 cm−2 day−1 can be
assumed for the derivation of on-orbit rates from the event
cross section attained at one of the proposed test facilities.
As a verification of the suitability of this method for
predicting on-orbit event rates, a couple of comparisons
are performed. In the first, for SEU, a few state-of-the-art
devices are chosen [46]. Both the heavy-ion and high-energy
proton responses of these devices are known, so that it is
possible to calculate the predicted event rates through the
standard Weibull fits [47] and then compare them with those
TABLE III
EXPECTED EVENT RATES (IN UNITS OF EVENTS/DEVICE/DAY) FOR SOME
DEVICES SENSITIVE TO SEU [46] BASED ON THE WEIBULL FITS OF
THE KNOWN HEAVY-ION AND HIGH-ENERGY PROTON CROSS SEC-
TIONS AND ON THE USE OF THE α FACTOR FROM THE CROSS
SECTIONS MEASURED IN A 200-MeV PROTON FACILITY
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THE EVENT RATES (IN UNITS OF EVENTS/DEVICE/DAY)
FOR SOME DEVICES SENSITIVE TO SEL [42] WITH THE EXPECTED
EVENT RATES FROM THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE α FACTOR AND
THE CROSS SECTIONS MEASURED AT CHARM
calculated with α = 1 × 107 cm−2 day−1 and the 200-MeV
proton data-point. The data are compared in Table III. For
all the considered devices, the rate calculated through α is
within ±30%, which is in agreement with the earlier specified
uncertainty.
For SEL, on-orbit event rates are available [42], so that
it is possible to compare the proposed prediction method
with actual in-space observations. In this case, the same
α = 1 × 107 cm−2 day−1 is used to predict the event rate
from the cross section measured at the CHARM facility.
The data are compared in Table IV. The agreement with
the predicted data and the in-space measured data is again
within ±30%.
Note that the α changes with the orbit, although it is possible
to calculate it for various orbits and just perform a rescaling
of the value here proposed. The other limitation is that this
method can work well for proton-dominated environments,
which are usually those for which system-level testing is
anyway best suited. Finally, the coverage is not guaranteed for
SEL associated with thicker volumes (e.g., 10 μm), although
it is also quite unlikely to observe any event during hadron
testing for such deep SVs.
This method can be generally extended to high-level losses
of functionality observed during the test to calculate their
expected rate on orbit and the impact on availability.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Cost-effective radiation testing schemes adapted to the func-
tional verification of large ensembles of devices, subsystems,
and full small satellites are flourishing. A general top-down
approach to functional verification through system-level radi-
ation testing that can be employed for higher risk acceptance
space missions was proposed.
Risk acceptance is the key parameter when it comes to
decide whether to pursue a system-level radiation verification
scheme. Several aspects of standard space qualification are
intrinsically overlooked for this kind of qualification scheme,
including TID WCA, ELDRS, and DD deviations from the
NIEL scaling among different materials and DSEE coverage.
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In addition, system-level testing of one or a few units is
associated with limited level of confidence even following
a pass outcome, and observability of root cause events may
not always be achieved. For all these reasons, system-level
radiation testing shall be seen as a tool that can cover for
the functional verification of those systems lying in the gray
area between “no-testing” and qualification based on standards
for component-level testing. Given the long list of intrinsic
limitations associated with system-level radiation testing, this
methodology shall not be seen as a cheap replacement of
standard qualification whenever risk acceptance would not
allow so.
A taxonomy for system-level radiation effects based on
their criticality was proposed. The state space of system-level
radiation testing is wider than the proposed top-level functional
verification given that the latter can be combined with some
standard component-level qualification. However, the scope
of this work was to take the very opposite end of the state
space and propose guidelines on how to extract precious
information about functional verification even when using the
simplest radiation model possible, that is, the system “as
is.” Engineering and radiation models of the system shall be
consistent and should be carefully verified prior to irradiation
as well as the test setup.
The proposed methodology is based on the use of deeply
penetrating beams (i.e., protons, neutrons, or mixed fields) due
to the intrinsic low penetration and fragmentation of ions and
to the relatively large volumes considered. Currently, there
are only a handful of facilities fulfilling the requirements for
the irradiation of bulky systems. Other considerations related
to beam characteristics such as the flux may have to be
assessed when choosing the most suitable facility for the test.
Sometimes, even the test infrastructure available at the facility
(e.g., cabling length, test equipment shielding) may play a role
on whether to pursue this kind of qualification due to radiation
effects observability limitations. Other test methodologies can
be built upon these general considerations to, for instance,
irradiate portions of the system or by making use of heavy
ions for the irradiation of single boards.
Test preparation for these kinds of tests may be as critical as
the test itself. A good balance between what it is expected to be
observed and in-depth observability shall be kept in order not
to affect the system radiation response in other ways. When-
ever the system itself is not equipped with protections from
potentially destructive radiation effects, it is good practice to
protect it at the level of the monitoring equipment.
Tailoring an effective test plan to fulfill all the objective
of the test is also similarly important. Testing the system in
a large enough set of configurations may help in identifying
worst case conditions and may provide more confidence than
simply testing the system in the “real” condition (which is
probably just an educated guess of how the system will most
likely be used). Whenever radiation data of the system and its
components are not available, it is suggested to always start
from a low enough flux and ramp up only when flux-dependent
events cannot be observed. In addition, the frequency of HLFs
shall be much smaller than the standard duty-cycle execution
time of the system.
Data exploitation in terms of reliability comes with a limited
level of confidence whenever a single unit is tested. More
confidence can be built on availability provided a sufficient
amount of events is observed with hadrons and for those mis-
sion environments dominated by protons. The environmental
similitude among the test facility energy deposition environ-
ments and those of certain space orbits (both in terms of
proton and heavy-ion energy depositions) can, if events are
seen during the test, allow the calculation of expected on-orbit
rates relying on the use of the alpha factor method. This
was shown to return mission rates compatible with actual
on-orbit measurements and the classic Weibull prediction.
While the alpha factor varies with the orbit, it was shown
to vary just slightly among the different hadronic beams and
SVs considered, meaning that the alpha factor could be easily
rescaled just based on the orbit. Nonetheless, it shall be
borne in mind that the hadron test may be blind to certain
potentially destructive events triggered by heavy ions and that
the proposed rate calculation method can be used to predict
only and solely events that could be observed during the test
with hadrons.
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